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6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiffs brought this action seeking a declaratory JUdgment action to determine the validity of a written
Compensation Agreement that provided for the payment to defendants
ot $250,000.00 and fifteen percent (15%) of the stock in a
corporation to be formed for the marketing of a principal adjusted
mortgage.

Plaintiffs also sought damages based on alleged

fraudulent representations of the defendants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Law and Motion
Division of tne Tnird Judicial District Court denied defendants'
Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to
Join Additional Parties.

Subsequently plaintiffs and defendants

stipulated to the entry of Judgment on one of the claims of the
plaintiffs and the dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims.

The

defendants have appealed from the denial of their Motion for Leave
to File an Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional
Parties.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the District Court's Order
denying their Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer and
Counterclaim and to Join Additional Parties.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the fall of 1981 plaintiffs incorporated The McNeil/
Mehew Group ("McNeil/Mehew") and sought investors to capitalize
McNeil/Mehew in order to market a principal adjusted mortgage to
financial institutions throughout the United States.
At plaintiffs' request, Cowan and Benz interested two
investor groups.

On December 3, 1981, proposals for investment in

McNeil/Mehew were made to these two investor groups -- a "Neppel"
group and a "Remlinger" or "Buttonwood Management Associates"
group.
Plaintiffs signed a written Compensation Agreement which
provided that if the Remlinger Group agreed to capitalize
McNeil/Mehew, that Cowan and Benz would be entitled to $250,000
and 15% of the stock.

(Tr. at 11-12, 557-58).

The plaintiffs thereafter made an agreement with the
Remlinger Group wherein Buttonwood invested $350,000 in
McNeil/Mehew in exchange for 49% of the corporate stock.

Neither

payment of any compensation nor issuance of stock was made to
Cowan and Benz.

Rerulinger and Buttonwood had been advised of the

written Compensation Agreement, but ignored it.
On January 28, 1982, plaintiffs filed a declaratory
judgment action against Cowan and Benz seeking a judgment that the
written Compensation Agreement was void and unenforceable.
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Defendant Benz, a resident of New Jersey, filed a Motion
lo Quash Service or, in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.

This Motion was denied, and a

Petition for Intermediate Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was
also denied.
On May 3, 1982, Defendant Benz filed an Answer generally
denying the allegations of plaintiffs' Complaint.

Defendant Benz

asserted no counterclaims against Plaintiffs McGregor and
Richardson at that time in order to preserve his objection to the
court's in personam jurisdiction.
On May 3, 1982, Defendants Benz and Cowan filed a
Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey against Richardson;
McGregor; Donald Remlinger; McNeil/Mehew Group, Inc., a Utah
corporation; and B.M.C. Acquisition Corporation, a New York
corporation, d/b/a Buttonwood Management Company, defendants.
This action alleged breach of the written Compensation Agreement
and claimed damages of $250,000 and 15% of the stock of McNeil/
Mehew.

Claims of tortious interference with prospective economic

relations, tortious interference with business relations, and
inducement to breach a contract were also alleged.
224-30,

(Tr. at

548-54).

On June 21, 1982, plaintiffs in the Utah action filed a
Motion for an Expedited Trial Setting.

This Motion was denied,

but the court did set a trial date of April 11, 1983.
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In the New Jersey action, McGregor, Richardson, Remlinger
and the other defendants moved to dismiss or stay the New Jersey
action because of the pending action in Utah.

On November 4, 1982

the New Jersey action was stayed on certain conditions, one of
which was that Remlinger submit to the jurisdiction of the Utah
Court.

(Tr. at 235-37, 559-61).
On January 12, 1983, defendants filed their Motion for

Leave to File an Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to Join
Additional Parties.

The proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim

was essentially identical to the action filed in the New Jersey
Court.

(Tr. at 206-19, 258-72).
On March 7, 1983, the District Court denied the

Defendants' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer and
Counterclaim and to Join Additional Parties.
entered a certain Memorandum Decision.

The court also

(Tr. at 365-67).

On or about March 16, 1983, Defendants Benz and Cowan
filed a Motion to Reconsider, or in the Alternative, to Amend
Order of the Court.

That Motion was denied.

On March 31, 1983, Defendants Benz and Cowan filed with
this Court a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ in the Nature of
Mandamus.

Oral argument was heard on April 4, 1983.

The Motion

was denied without an explanation as to the basis for the denial.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING THE
DEFENDANTS TO FILE COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS AND TO JOIN
ADDITIONAL PARTIES.
A.

Defendants' Counterclaims are Compulsory in Nature.
Defendants' Counterclaims for breach of the written

Compensation Agreement and for damages as a result of plaintiffs'
tortious conduct are compulsory counterclaims.

The refusal of the

trial court to allow the defendants to litigate their counterclaims
in this action, unless reversed, will result in the claims forever
being barred.
Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states
in part:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing
party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not reguire
for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction.
(Emphasis added).
Defendants' counterclaims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that formed the basis for plaintiffs' action;
plaintiffs do not and cannot contest this fact.
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Plaintiffs'

Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the Compensation
Agreement between the plaintiffs and defendants is void and
unenforceable as well as damages for fraudulent misrepresentations.

The defendants' Counterclaim seeks an award of the $250,0Gl

and 15% of the stock of McNeil/Mehew as set forth in the
Compensation Agreement.

Defendants' counterclaims of tortious

interference with prospective economic relations, tortious
interference with business relations, and inducement to breach a
contract all arise out of the same transaction.
B.

The Compulsory Counterclaims of the Defendants
Will Be Barred if not Allowed to be Litigated
in this Action.
Rule 13(a) precludes assertion of a counterclaim which

should have been asserted in a prior action.
A.L.R.2d 621 (and subsequent supplements).

See generally, 22
The Utah Supreme Court

in Todaro v. Gardner, 285 P. 2d 839, 842 (Utah 1955), stated that "a
counterclaim not presented to the court on a matter involving the
same transaction is forever barred."

See Slim Olson, Inc. v.

Winegar, 246 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1952); 6 Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, § 1417.
In Cyclops Corporation v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 71
F.R.D. 616 (W.D. Pa. 1976), the court stated:
The failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim precludes its later assertion in another,
subsequent lawsuit.
In so holding, the federal

-6-

courts have reasoned that (1) the sheer force of
Rule 13(a) prevents later suits, or (2) that the
principle of res judicata, apart from the policy
of Rule 13(a), precludes the litigation of claims
that either were actually litigated or could have
been litigated between the same parties in a
prior lawsuit.
Id. at 620.
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision expressed
concern about potential prejudice to plaintiffs because granting
defenaants' Motion would postpone the trial date.

Some inconven-

ience may have been imposed upon plaintiffs if the time for
adJudicating their claims had been delayed.

Plaintiffs'

inconvenience, however, is minimal compared to the permanent
pre)ud1ce sustained by the defendants if their compulsory
counterclaims are not allowed to be tried in this action.

If

defenaants' compulsory counterclaims are not allowed to be tried
in this action, they will never be adjudicated.

Justice requires

that the plaintiffs' day in court be postponed rather than the
defendants' day in court be forever foreclosed.
C.

The Stay of the New Jersey Action was Based on Plaintiffs'
Representation that Defendants' Claims Could be Litigated
in the Utah Action.
The Complaint filed by Cowan and Benz in New Jersey

sought damages for breach of the written Compensation Agreement,
unJust enrichment, inducement to breach a contract and tortious
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interference with a prospective economic advantage.
224-30, 548-54).

(Tr. at

These same causes of action were alleged in

Cowan's and Benz's Counterclaim.
Richardson, McGregor, Remlinger and McNeil/Mehew filed a
Joint Memorandum in support of their Motion to Dismiss or Stay the
New Jersey action.

(Tr. at 562-70A).

This Memorandum stated:

Defendants Eldon L. Richardson, II
("Richardson"), D. Scott McGregor ("McGregor"),
Donald Remlinger ("Remlinger") and McNeil/Mehew
Group, Inc. ("McNeil/Mehew"), submit this
Memorandum in support of their motion to stay
this proceeding pending resolution of a prior
pending action in the State of Utah implicating
precisely the same issues. The Utah action will
effectively dispose of this controversy. As
shall be demonstrated, the single appropriate
course is for this Court to stay the New Jersey
action pending resolution of the controversy in
Utah.
The entire relief sought in this action
can undoubtedly be obtained in the previously
commenced Utah action; the issues and the parties
in the two suits are substantially the same; and
there are surely no special equities which would
compel this Court to allow this action to go
forward.
(Tr. at 563).

* * *
This action is therefore the mirror image of
the Utah action.
No discovery has been taken by
either party in the New Jersey action. Nor are
there any motions or other proceedings currently
pending in the New Jersey action; by contrast,
the Utah action is actively being litigated.
Consequently, defendants in this action move this
Court to stay the New Jersey proceeding pending
the outcome of the prior pending action in the
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Third Judicial District Court of Utah, which w'll
effectively dispose of all of the issues in this
Action.
(Tr. at 564-65).

* * *
The Utah action will certainly afford
"adequate relief" and "do complete justice"
between these parties. No "special equity"
militates to deny these defendants the relief
they seek.
The issue presented by this action --- the
validity and possible enforcement of the
Compensation Agreement --- is identical to that
presented in the Utah action, where all of the
matters in controversy between the parties can be
resolved.
In the interest of conservation of
judicial resources, avoidance of duplication of
litigation and the convenience of the parties,
this Court should stay the within proceedings
pending the completion of the Utah action.
(Tr. at 567).

* * *
In view of all the circumstances before this
Court, and in light of the foregoing principles
of law, it is needless and undesirable to proceed
here and in Utah simultaneously.
Indeed, to
allow this action to go forward at this time
would cause unnecessary duplication of discovery,
litigation and annoyance and harassment of the
defendants in this action.
Consequently, this
action should be stayed pending conclusion of the
Utan action.
(Tr. at 570).
The New Jersey Court entered a stay order:
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ORDERED that this action be and the same
hereby is stayed as to all proceedings pending
the disposition of an action in the courts of the
State of Utah entitled D. Scott McGregor and
Eldon L. Richardson, II v. Peter A. Benz and
David Cowan, Civil No. C-82-727, on condition
that Donald Remlinger not contest the exercise of
jurisdiction over him by the courts of Utah in
any claim asserted by the defendants here and
arising out of the same transactions and
occurrences in issue in this or that action; and

* * *
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event the
defendants in the Utah action assert a claim
naming as a defendant there any of the defendants
named here over whom the Utah court determines it
has no jurisdiction, leave is given to any party
on notice in accordance with the Rules Governing
the Courts of the State of New Jersey to move to
dissolve the stay granted herein for good cause
shown, provided, however, that nothing in this
Order shall be deemed to permit any party
automatically to dissolve this stay.
(Tr. at 236-37, 560-61).
Richardson and McGregor represented to the New Jersey
Court that it should stay the New Jersey action because all issues
between the parties could be litigated in the Utah action.

They

then vigorously argued that the Utah trial court should not allow
the defendants to assert its counterclaims.

It would be a gross

injustice for defendants Benz and Cowan to be denied the right to
litigate their claims in this action; plaintiffs should be estoppea
to argue that such denial is just and proper.
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D.

Based Upon Review Standards Applied at Both the Federal
and State Levels, the Trial Court Abused its Discretion
in Refusing to Allow Defendants to File Their Compulsory
Counterclaims.
Defendants have found no Utah case law setting forth the

specific criteria to determine whether a trial court has committed
an abuse of discretion in refusing to allow a party to amend its
pleadings to assert compulsory counterclaims.

However, under the

clearly articulated standards of the federal courts and other
Jurisdictions, the trial court committed error in this case.
1.

Federal Case Law.

The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear
tnat courts must heed the mandate of Rule 15(a)

1

that leave to

amend "shall be freely given when Justice so requires."
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 9 L.Ed.2d 222, 226 (1962).
&

Foman v.

Polin v. Dun

Bradstreet, Inc., 511 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1975); Food Basket,

Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1967); Travelers
Indemnity Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1967);
Ziegler v. Akin, :l61 F.2d 88 (10th Cir. 1958).
In the absence of any apparent or declared
reason -- such as undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

lRule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
iaentical to the Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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amenaments previously allowed, undue prejudice to
the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, futility of amendment, etc. -- the
leave sought should, as the rules require, be
'freely given'.
Foman, supra at 226.
The rationale of this liberal amendment policy is to
insure that litigants have an opportunity to test on the merits
the validity of their claims.
In Refrigeradora Del Noroeste S.A. v. Appelbaum, 248
F.2d, 858 (7th Cir. 1957), the Seventh Circuit referred to the
manaate of Rule 15(a).

The court held that it was error to deny

the motion for leave to file an answer and counterclaim because
the plaintiff corporation was not available for service of process
anywhere within the United States.

The court of appeals concluded

that the trial court, by refusing to permit the amendment to be
filed, had, in fact, denied the defendant his day in court.

Id.

at 862.
2.

Case Law From Other States.

A carefully considered line of authority on the question
of leave to amend or add a compulsory counterclaim comes from the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

In Randolph v. Franklin

Investment Co., 398 A.2d 340 (D.C. App. 1979)

(argued en bane

1978), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated:
In the present record we find none of the
reasons which the courts have used to justify
denial of leave· to file a counterclaim. This was
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tne Randolphs' first such request.
The case had
been pending little more than ten months.
No
party previously nad requested a continuance.
There was no indication of bad faith or dilatory
motive on the Randolphs' part.
The counterclaim
was not obviously without merit.
Finally, we do
not perceive preJudice.
Id. at 351 (footnotes omitted).

The court reversed and ordered

the trial court to allow the plaintiffs to file their counterclaim.
In Bronson v. Borst, 404 A.2d 960 (D.C. App. 1979), the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals again stated the criteria
for determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in
denying a motion for leave to amend the answer to include a
compulsory counterclaim:
Tnose criteria include:
the number of such
requests, the length of the pendency of the
trial, the number of previous continuances, the
existence of bad faith or dilatory motive, the
merit of the counterclaim, and the existence of
preJudice to the other party.
.!!:!_. at 96:S.

In Bronson the court concluded that the trial court

erred in its decision to deny the request to file a compulsory
counterclaim.

Those same criteria have been applied in that

Jurisdiction in subsequent cases.

See Bennett v. Fun & Fitness

ot Silver Hill, Inc., 434 A.2d 476 (D.C. App. 1981); Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Company v. District of Columbia, 441 A.2d
969

(D.C. App. 1982).
In Romish v. Albo, 291 So.2d 24

(Fla. App. 1974), the

court ruled that the trial court's failure to grant leave to amend
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in that case was an abuse of discretion where counsel for one ot
the parties had discovered information creating a valid compulsory
counterclaim six months after filing the answer.

Id. at 25.

Defendants' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer
and Counterclaim was the first and only such request for leave to
amend pleadings.

No continuances of any trial date had been

sought in this case.

There is no basis for asserting that

defendants' Motion was submitted either in baa faith or because
of dilatory motive.

The merit of defendants' counterclaims is

readily apparent.
The only pre]udice that was asserted by plaintiffs was
that the trial date would be postponed.

An impartial weighing of

the interests of Justice requires that plaintiffs' day in court be
delayed in order that defendants may have their day in court.

The

trial court abused its discretion in not granting leave to the
defendants to file their compulsory counterclaims.

II.

THE JOINDER OF ADDITIONAL PARTIES IS NECESSARY FOR A
COMPLETE ADJUDICATION OF THE MATTERS IN CONTROVERSY.
A.

Leave to Amend Should be Freely Granted to Allow
Complete AdJudication of Matters in Controversy.
Rule 15(a), U.R.C.P., provides that leave to amend

pleadings should be freely granted.

The Utah Supreme Court has

indicated that this rule should be liberally construed so that all

-14-

elements of a controversy may be decided and determined in one
action.

In Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 57 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1936), the

court stated:
The amended complaint was filed before trial and
oefendants' answer thereto was filed before trial
of the cause . • • • A more liberal rule will be
applied in cases where amendments are offered
unoer such circumstances than when offered during
or after trial, where the parties may be taken by
surprise or handicapped in the meeting of new
allegations.
The rule, however, is toward
liberality in allowance of amendments to pleadings for the purpose of permitting a complete
ad]udication of the matters in controversy and in
the furtherance of justice.
Id. at 1136.
In Thomas J. PecK & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products,
Inc., 515 P.2d 446 (Utah 1973), the court stated:
Some tempest has been raised about the court
allowing the plaintiff to make tardy amendments
to the pleadings.
In doing so he wisely and
properly stated:
The pleadings are never more important
than the cause that is before the court
. • • • There can be no prejudice in this
case because we'll give ample time for any
answer • • • •
Tnis is in harmony with what we regard as the
correct policy: of recognizing the desirability
of the pleadings setting forth definitely framed
issues, but also of permitting amendment where
the interest of Justice so requires, and the
adverse party is given fair opportunity to meet
it.
Id. at 449-50.
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B.

Defei::!.dants' Meritor iou~-~~unt~~~~ms
~ainst

Incluc!_~_f!.~~~

Nonr~~idents.

Defendants have alleged breach of the written
Compensation Agreement and claims in tort against the additional
parties Remlinger, McNeil/Mehew, Buttonwood, and the individual
partners of Buttonwood.

These tort claims are (1) tortious

interference with prospective economic relations,

(2) tortious

interference with business relations, and (3) inducement to breach
a contract.
Each of these torts is recognized by Utah law.
Supreme Court in

~~h

Furniture

and_~arpe~<;:_~:__~~

The Utah

Isom, No. 17264

(Utah 1982), recently recognized for the first time the tort of
tortious interference with prospective economic relations.
Tortious interference with business relations is also recognized
in Utah, see,

~·

'!:_urtle

Mana~~~t:..L._!i::!.~':!~9..is

Inc., 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982):
Sa~t

Management,

Glob~~~~~~i::!.9.._~~~~~nk

Lake, 586 P.2d 420 (Utah 1978).

breach a contract was recognized in

of

The tort of inducement to
Moun~aii::!._§.tate~_Sports~_Inc.

v. Sharman, 353 F. Supp. 613 (D. Utah 1972),

rev'<!_~n

other

grounds, EckleLv· Sharman, 548 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1977).

c.

All of the Additional Parties are Subject to the
Jurisdiction

Q~he

Uta~~~urts.

The McNeil/Mehew Group, Inc. is a Utah corporation and
transacts business in Utah.

The stay of the New Jersey state
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court action was expressly conditioned on Remlinger's submission to
the Jurisdiction of the courts of Utah.

(Tr. at 235-37, 559-61).

The Buttonwood partnership and the individual partners are
subJect to the personal jurisdiction of this Court under the Utah
long-arm statute.
&

2

See Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. Ted R. Brown

Assoc., Inc., 618 P.2d 1004, 1005-07 (Utah 1980).
1.

The Nonresidents Sought to be Joined as Parties Have
Caused Tortious Injury Within This State.
The actions of the nonresident counterclaim

defendants, through their agent(s), have deprived a Utah citizen
(Cowan) of his compensation under the written Compensation
Agreement and deprived defendants Cowan and Benz of the economic
benefits they would have received by becoming principals in the
Utah corporation of McNeil/Mehew.

The torts allegedly committed by

tne nonresident counterclaim defendants against Benz and Cowan are
significant.

Benz and Cowan have been deprived of participation in

a lucrative business opportunity and/or deprived of substantial
compensation for valuable services rendered.

The actions of the

nonresident defendants have had a definite, foreseeable impact in
Utah.

2utah Code Annotated § 78-27-24. A more extensive
discussion of the bases for personal jurisdiction is contained in
Defendants' and Counterclaimants' Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Leave to Amend Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional
Parties (Tr. at 578-89).
-17-

Transacted Business Within This State.
Remlinger as an agent for Buttonwood and its
partners, negotiated extensively with McGregor and Richardson both by telephone over interstate lines and in person, including
at least one personal visit to Utah for the specific purpose, in
part, of determining how to deal with the claims of Cowan and
Benz.

Deposition of D. Scott McGregor

239-45, 274, 279, 306;

(Jan. 18 and 19, 1983) at

(Feb. 24, 1983) at 4-5, 8-11.

Buttonwood was involved directly in interstate commerce
by funding McNeil/Mehew which is actively engaged in soliciting
interstate business. Buttonwood and its individual partners,
acting through their agents, Remlinger and Caruso, have sought the
protection of the State of Utah by entering into agreements for
the subsequent incorporation of a Utah corporation and its
business operation in Utah.
D. Scott McGregor.
McNeil/Mehew.
3.

See Exhibit 46 to Deposition of

Remlinger and Caruso are directors of

Id.
The Personal

Jurisd~ction

of

t>i~tah

Courts Over

Nonresident Defendants is as Broad as the Fourteenth
--~---

The Utah Supreme Court now recognizes that the Utah
State Legislature intended to make its jurisdictional reach over
nonresident defendants as broad as the Fourteenth Amendment would
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allow.

Such has not always been the case.

A restrictive view

characterized by Cate Rental Co. v. Whalen & Co., 549 P.2d 707
(Utah 1976); Hill v. Zale Corporation, 482 P.2d 332 (Utah 1971),
prevailed earlier.

Under the former standard, jurisdiction over

nonresident defendants was exerted provided the non-resident
defendant was engaged in some substantial activity with some
degree of continuity within the state.

Mallory Engineering, supra

at 1006 n.2.
The more recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court
uphold the expansive grant of jurisdictional power intended by the
legislature.

See,

~,

Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper

Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978).

The current standard

was summarized by the Utah Supreme Court in Mallory Engineering,
supra:
The resultant standard for determining a
nonresident's amenability to the jurisdiction of
the state courts is not whether the nonresident
is "present" in the state, but rather whether the
nonresident has such contacts with the "state of
the forum as make it reasonable, in the context
of our federal system of government, to require
the (nonresident) to defend the particular suit
which is brought." This reasonableness standard,
incorporating the requirements of fair play and
substantial justice, looks to the quality and
nature of the nonresident's contacts with the
forum state. Therefore, the central concern of
the inquiry into personal jurisdiction is the
relationship of the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation, to each other.
Mallory Engineering, supra at 1007 (footnotes omitted)
added).
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(emphasis

The nonresident counterclaim defendants' transaction of
business through their agent{s) satisfies the required minimal
factual nexus.

The nonresident counterclaim defendants have

purposely availed themselves of the privilege of contracting under
the laws of the State of Utah for the incorporation of a Utah
corporation in which they would possess a substantial ownership
interest.

By doing so, they have invoked the benefits and

protection of this state.

Personal jurisdiction over these

nonresident counterclaim defendants is warranted on the basis of
the business they have transacted through their agents in this
state.
CONCLUSION
One of the two defendants in this action, Peter A. Benz,
a nonresident, has been held to be subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the Utah courts.

There is no dispute that the

counterclaims of the defendants are compulsory in nature.

If

defendants' compulsory counterclaims are not permitted to be tried
in the District Court, Rule 13, together with the doctrines of
collateral estoppel and res judicata will preclude defendants from
raising their claims in the action that is currently stayed in a
New Jersey state court.

In short, the question presented by

this appeal is whether a nonresident defendant may be held
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,,,, tage to the personal Jurisdiction of this state's courts,
~nrl

simultaneously denied the opportunity to have adjudicated

mer1tor1ous compulsory counterclaims.
Sound legal precedent and equitable considerations
support defendants' position.

The District Court abused its

d1scret1on in failing to grant defendants' Motion for leave to
file their amended answer and counterclaims and to join additional
parties.

Neither the District Court nor the plaintiffs

articulated specifically how plaintiffs would be prejudiced if the
trial were postponed.

Plaintiffs have not detailed any financial,

commercial or legal interests that would have been impaired had
the trial date been continued.

Defendants' Motion to Amend was

the first request to amend pleadings in this action.

There had

been no continuances requested in this case.
The District Court in its Memorandum Decision stated two
reasons for denying appellants' Motion for Leave to File an
Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional Parties.
The Court stated that "defendants' Motion to Amend and to Join
Aaa1t1onal Parties would raise new issues, delay the long-standing
trial date, and would seriously prejudice the plaintiffs having
the matter heard as scheduled."

(Tr. at 366).

Appellants concede that the granting of the Motion for
J,Pave

to File an Amended Answer both would have raised new issues
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and delayed the trial date.

However, neither of those grounds

indicates that plaintiffs would have been seriously preJudiced
their rights.

1,

It was entirely appropriate and expected that the

issues raised in the New Jersey action would be adjudicated in the
Utah action because this was what the plaintiffs represented to
the New Jersey Court and was the reason why it was stayed.

The

inclusion of these issues was not the inclusion of spurious or
indirectly related issues.

The issues presented by appellants'

counterclaim were directly related to the occurrences and
transactions that formed the basis for plaintiffs' complaint.
The determination whether to delay a trial date must
involve a careful and fair weighing of the interests of justice.
Although the District Court stated that the interests of justice
led it to conclude that the Motion should be denied, it is
incomprehensible to suggest that one party should be forever
foreclosed from ever having its day in court in order to avoid
temporarily delaying another party's day in court.
Plaintiffs argue that defendants filed an Answer in this
action and therefore had an opportunity at that time to present
any counterclaims.

It should be emphasized that the Answer was

filed only after Defendant Benz unsuccessfully challenged the
jurisdiction of the Utah courts.

The facts in this case are clear

in demonstrating that Appellant Benz at each juncture attempted tn
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,,~serve

his right to contest the exercise of personal jurisdiction

er him by the Utah courts.

He was compelled to answer in this

a_t1on at the peril of being subject to a default judgment.

His

filing of the action in New Jersey was a timely and responsible
effort to present valid claims against plaintiffs and other
parties that properly should be included in this action.
The Joint Memorandum filed by plaintiffs, together with
uonald Remlinger and McNeil/Mehew, in support of their motion to
dismiss or stay the New Jersey action,

represented to the court

that if a stay were ordered in the New Jersey action, the Utah
courts would be able to "effectively dispose of all the issues in
this action."

(Tr. at 565).

action will certainly afford

They also argued that "the Utah
'adequate relief' and 'do complete

Justice' between these parties.

(Tr. at 567).

The New Jersey court stayed that action on the condition
that Donald Remlinger submit to the jurisdiction of the Utah
courts and that all issues be considered there.

The Stay Order of

the New Jersey court was entered on November 4, 1982.

Five weeks

later Appellants Benz and Cowan filed their Motion for Leave to
File Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional
Parties in the Utah action, which asserted, as has been conceded
by plaintiffs, essentially the same claims that had been presented

in the New Jersey action.
Lhe representations

mad~

Contrary to the letter and spirit of
by plaintiffs and others to the New
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Jersey court to inauce it tu '-1' ar,t a std/ o!

procePrl ina s in

Lr ..

action, plaintiffs have tenaciously resisted every effort of
appellants to have their claims incluaen in this action.
For these reasons, defendants submit that the District
Court's decision to deny defendants' Motion for Leave to File an
Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional Parties

~a'

an abuse of discretion and requires reversal.
DATED this

/5~

day of July, 1983.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Merlin O. Baker

Adams
Attorneys for Appellants
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-1996
Telephone:
(801) 523-1500
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CERTIFICATE OF SLRVICE

I hereby certify that on the

\~day

of July, 1983, two

true anJ correct copies of the foregoing Appellants'
111,11led, postage prepaid,
~u1tter,

to LeRoy S. Axland, J. Michael Hansen,

Axland, Armstrong & Hanson,

700, Salt Lake City, Utah

Brief was

84101.
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